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BEING AND TIME. MARTIN HEIDEGGER. Translattd b)•. John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson. SCM PRESS LTD. BLOOMSBURY STREET LONDON. BEING AND TIME. MARTIN HEIDEGGER. Translated by. John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson. HARPER & ROW. PUBLISHERS. New York. Hagerstown, San . Sampler through page 51 of PDF, followed by Postscript on seven words. Martin Heidegger. Being and Time. An Annotated Translation.

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MARTIN HEIDEGGER. BEING AND TIME. Translated by. John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson. I]. BLACI

Being and Time German: Sein und Zeit is a book by the German philosopher Martin Heidegger , in which the author seeks to analyse the concept of Being. Heidegger maintains that this has fundamental importance for philosophy and that, since the time of the Ancient Greeks, philosophy has avoided the question, turning instead to the analysis of particular beings. Heidegger attempts to revive ontology through a reawakening of the question of the meaning of being. He approaches this through a fundamental ontology that is a preliminary analysis of the being of the being to whom the question of being is important, i.

Being and time Year: There are many reasons that Being and Time poses special problems for its translator and for the readers of an English language translation. Three aspects of the text are especially noteworthy and so need to be commented upon here. First, one needs to bear in minci that, in Being and Time, Heidegger has introduced a large number of German neologisms. Words, such as Befindlichkeit, which would be readily intelligible to a German reader since it has a clear relation to an everyday German phrase wie befinden Sie sich?

Typically, Heidegger's neologisms have strong connections to everyday phrases or words, and so exhibit a curious mix of strangeness and familiarity. Second, Heidegger frequently employs quite common vocabulary in uncommon ways. Here the most visible example is his use of the word Dasein which, besicles having a long history as a philosophie term it is, for example, one of the categories in Hegel's Science of Logic , is a word that belongs to everyday conversation.

One ofHeidegger's intentions in Being and Time is to re-appropriate that word and give it new meaning without completely repudiating its everyday sense. A gain, a German rea der might find a sort of al chemy of familiari ty and strangeness in Heidegger's use of such words. We have seen that the question of what it means to be is already lurking even in such ordinary questions as what does it mean to be in jail.

Indeed, all of these retranslated ques tions contain the infnitival form of the verb "to be" ; so that we fnd our selves asking, What does it mean to be in space? The point is, that in all of the ways we fnd ourselves existing or doing or being acted upon, it is possible to reformulate the question so that the infnitive "to be" becomes the unifying and underlying question.

And so the technique or method becomes obvious. In other words, it is precisely because I can ask What does it mean to be a body? For, in carrying out an inquiry into what it means to be a body I am already making sense of what it means to be in a particular way or mode.

Heidegger - Being and Time 300Dpi Eng

An investigation into the various fundamental ways in which I can be said to be, such as "what it means to be in the world" or "what it means to have possibilities" re veals the important ways in which I can be said to be, and from a consid eration of how these various ways of existing share a common meaning, it is possible then to focus on what it means to be at all.

In this way, the approach to all the great questions not only is raised in terms of what it means to be, it also provides a thematic unity to the various inquiries. As we shall soon see in the analysis of the actual text, Heidegger begins by actually carrying out an inquiry into the various ways or modes of existing and then discerns the underlying meaning shared by all of these ways. In doing this he avoids the necessity of having to assume some kind of entity or referent that lies behind these modes of being.

In short, he has simply, but profoundly, turned the entire metaphysical approach up side down. We do not frst ask what a man is and then wonder what it means; rather we begin by asking what it means to be a man, and then can decide what a man is. Any philosophical inquiry can be understood in terms of the primary danger or fear which the thinker seeks to avoid at all costs.

We under stand Descartes just because we also understand the threat he is seeking to overcome, namely total epistemic scepticism. It is the fear of scepticism that requires Descartes to fnd a truth so obvious and clear it cannot be denied. In the same way the reader of Kantian ethics recognizes that what dominates Kant's reasoning is his desire to avoid moral relativism at all costs. The Categorical Imperative makes sense to us simply because the threat of multiple opinions renders the entire edifce of moral reasoning crippled.

In understanding Heidegger, one must recognize that the threat to reason and thought which he identifes as the supreme evil to avoid at all costs is nihilism. By nihilism is meant the denial that existence, par ticularly human existence, is meaningful. Heidegger's approach to funda mental ontology takes its focus from his revolutionary question, what does it mean to be? For if Heidegger can show that the question of meaning is capable of being asked and responded to, then the challenge from the nihilist has been met squarely and decisively.

And so, before turning to the analysis of the text, one fnal introductory discussion may prove benefcial. This is the threat of scepticism; and by this threat the entire philosophical enterprise is held hostage. Un less it can be shown that there really is a difference between knowledge and opinion, the great labor of mighty thinkers is no more signifcant than the idle ruminations of a lazy and rebellious youth. Scepticism thus is a formidable threat of misology-a hatred of reasoning-which, if not confronted will destroy the importance and value of philosophy alto gether.

Luckily there are meaningful responses to scepticism, and the thinker need not abandon his entire endeavor because of this lurking threat.

Nevertheless, scepticism is always there, perhaps held at bay by superior thinking, but always threatening to break in on an endeavor and render it sterile. A slightly more sinister form of misology is moral relativism. This crit icism of reasoning admits that one can carry out schemes of explanation designed to show us the proper moral principles, but we then simply shrug our shoulders when the effort is complete and archly assure him that although this may be his opinion, we too can opine about such mat ters, and our opinion is different.

As in the case of the sceptic, there are defences against this threat, but it too remains always lurking in the shad ows of our inquiry, ready to pounce on an unsuspecting theorist or thinker who is not armed against it. For both scepticism and relativism are absolutist critiques, that is, they undermine the entire edifce of rea soned inquiry altogether by rendering it impotent. The third of these great misological attacks on thought is nihilism, and it is the most sinister of all.

The nihilist may admit that we do indeed have knowledge rather than opinion. He may even admit that it is wrong to break a promise and that we are able to show, by reasoning and analysis, that this censure against promise-breaking is not a matter of opinion but is absolute.

He may even act according to these principles himself, and admit that he feels an obli gation to keep promises and respect the dignity of others. But, he claims, in the last analysis, so what? To have knowledge and to know the moral law do not mean anything.

In the last analysis, a world that is revealed by cognitive principles and a world governed by discernible moral laws are simply no more or no less meaningful than a world lacking such laws and principles. In short, though we may have knowledge and may even know what we ought to do, it does not matter. Nothing matters.

For 1 2 commentary on Being and Time knowledge and morality of themselves do not make the world meaning ful.

Being and Time

And since these principles cannot show us why the world matters or why it is meaningful, there can be no overwhelming reason to carry out the diffcult inquiries that discover the principles, since in the last analysis, who cares? The most dangerous approach one can take to the problem of nihilism is one of attitudinal persuasion, or to treat the threat as a mere incidence of bad psychology.

For the argument is genuine and the threat real. Even if you can change my attitude or my psychological outlook, it does not challenge the truth of what I say. Why should any of this matter? In what way is the world meaningful? In the absence of good reasons to the con trary, what is to stop me from simply abandoning the entire enterprise of thought because it does not matter? Unless the fundamental discipline not only provides me with a sense of what is true and good, but also what is meaningful, the entire endeavor is threatened.

Heidegger's analysis of Being begins with the argument that Being matters, and it does so by analysing the meaning of Being rather than the knowability of Being or the advantage of moral conduct. In his ap proach, Heidegger overcomes the sharp distinctions between fact and value and between subject and object.

Rather than isolating the powers of reason and thought by restricting them to the determination of what is the case, Heidegger shows that the fundamental discipline, the study of what it means to be, is already i. He shows that I not only exist, but that I exist meaning fully. A casual glance at the table of contents reveals that many of Heidegger's concerns are focused on questions that seem to belong to the feld of values or value-theory.

Yet, these analyses are presented not as values at all but as dimensions of Being itself. It may be helpful to the reader to consider this argument in a general way before attacking the individual sections.

Traditionally, philosophers have approached the fundamental ques tions by distinguishing the knower from the world it knows. The world is out there, and the task of the thinker is somehow to accommodate what is in us, or in our minds, with what is outside us; we are subjects, and the world is our object.

Thus, if we are to uncover any values, whether they be moral, aesthetic, or simply hedonistic, they cannot be found in the neutral, ob jective reservoir of all things, the world as it is.

Even truth is beguiled by this sharp distinction between subject and object, for what we fnally Introducti on 1 3 come to mean by truth is the disvaluing of our perceptions: what i s true is objective.

And martin pdf being heidegger time

The logic is thus inescapable: if truth is objective and values subjective, then all values are necessarily untrue; i. But Heidegger entirely repudiates the distinction, and thus reestablishes a unifed account of what it means to be. It is impossible to argue that the world is obj ective, and the knower merely the subject set over and against the object, for it is palpable upon refection that I am already in the world.

To be a subject and to be an object presupposes that we are already in the world. The world cannot be my representation, for I am already a part of the world. Being in the world is thus a characteristic of my existence; the world is not "outside" of me; rather I am in the world. When I talk about Being, therefore, I must talk about what it means to be in the world. But to be in the world is already i. It is not the case that my existence is somehow neutral, that values are somehow made-up, and that facts are merely discovered.

Rather, to be at all is to be as meaningful, to matter, to care. It is, of course, possible to focus our attention on aspects of any given object solely in terms of its physical properties, but such a focus is a specialized, rarefed, and indeed abstract consideration only of entities conceived in a highly artifcial and specialized way.

The establishment of a fundamen tal discipline, which Heidegger calls "Fundamental Ontology," must pre cede all distinctions between fact and value, with the realization that an unvalued fact and a pure value are both abstractions. Once it is seen that the subject-object distinction is valid only within a certain restricted realm of what it means to exist, and that the fact-value distinction is an artifcial one, sustained only by purely formal abstrac tion, the initiation of Heidegger's inquiry into what it means to be, in the manner he develops, makes perfectly good sense.

And with this real ization, the threat of nihilism is profoundly answered. It is diffcult to understand why so many contemporary theorists, especially among the followers of Leo Strauss, and to a lesser extent the movements in contem porary French philosophy following J. Sartre and Jacques Derrida, should make the outrageous claim that Heidegger espouses nihilism, or that his thinking "leads" to nihilism.

Nothing could be further from the truth. As this commentary unfolds, and the critical accounts of the exis tential modalities are revealed, the reader can discover for himself the tre mendous advantage of Heidegger's wisdom in initiating his inquiry by focusing on the fundamental question, What does it mean to be? The 1 4 Commentary on Being and Time only consideration not allowed by such a beginning is that Being has no meaning. If Being has no meaning, how is it possible to carry out an in quiry into what it means to be?

It is tle very fact that Heidegger can and does carry out such an inquiry that ultimately refutes any possibility of nihilism. According to its origi nal projection the work was to have been almost three times as large as its present published form-which is incomplete. In its original design the work was to contain two major parts; but only two-thirds of the frst part were ever published. The missing third section of Part One has been the subject of much debate as to its possible future publication;2 in place of the second part a series of other works have appeared, which deal with the so-called destruction of the history of philosophy.

Excluding the two-part introduction, in which Heidegger explains his method and procedure, Division One of Being and Time concerns the "existential analytic. Heidegger takes the accepted and normal problem areas of philosophy and reinterprets them in terms of transcendental awareness. He takes a concept like "world," for example: instead of treating the world cosmologically as an obj ective entity, or epistemologically as an object of knowledge, he examines what it means for a human being to be in a world.

He asks: What does it mean for us to be in a world? He pursues this kind of ques tion regarding several major concepts: e. In this way, "world," "self," "fear, " and "understanding" are not objective entities divorced from' the type of subjective concern about them, nor are they "defni tions" in any abstract or verbal sense.

Each is, instead, a way in which one exists; one of the many ways in which I exist is to be aware of the world. What the world actually is, is replaced by the question of what 2.

Too much debate, perhaps. To be sure, the fact that the fnal synthesis is missing is doubtless something to be regretted; but this does not mean that the entire attempt of the frst sections is thereby made useless or invalid. Heidegger himself, in the Foreword to Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, specif cally points to his study of Kant as a part of the original project of Being and Time.

Martin Heidegger (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

The historical section and the analytic section were to be worked out together as a twofold at tack against traditional metaphysics. I ntroducti on 1 5 it means for me to be in a world. Heidegger calls these modes of existence whose analysis reveals what it means to be existentials. In many of his arguments in which he describes the nature of these existentials, Heideg ger points out that, like the Kantian categories, they are not the result of an abstraction from an experience; rather, they are presupposed in an experience and make that experience possible: hence they logically come prior to any experience and are a priori.

When I ask, How is it possible for me to understand what it means to be in the world? For when I ask how something is possible, I am not asking for its factual characteristics, but rather for what might be called its transcendental pre suppositions. When Kant points out that the category of cause and effect is presupposed in scientifc explanation and thereby makes science pos sible, he is stating an essential philosophical point. If one tries to fnd evi dence of cause and effect in empirical observation, one is bound to end in a fruitless search, as David Hume so adequately demonstrated.

Kant is right in saying that causality is a priori; and it is the condition under which science itself is made possible. In a similar way, when one realizes that one is aware of one's own existence, one must ask for the modes of awareness that make possible such confrontation of one's meaning.

Whatever the explanation for any such awareness, it must be of the char acter of an a priori, otherwise it would not explain the fact of awareness. The explanation of a fact cannot ever be the result of a fact; it must, in deed, logically precede it. For this reason, Heidegger's existential analytic is an analysis of the a priori conditions under which one's existence is made meaningful.

The table of contents of Being and Time reveals what these existentials are. But the examination of such concepts in the existential analytic is, by itself, insuffcient. For the entire investigation of the existential analytic is done, according to Heidegger, from an "everyday" or "in authentic" perspective. In order to achieve the higher ontological level needed for a truly fundamental ontology, one must reanalyze and reinter pret the entire existential analytic, but from a new perspective.

This new perspective follows from the frst analysis; it amounts to the fact that the one who is investigating-who, in this case, is also the investigated-is limited by, and takes his dimensions from, time. This second or higher kind of analysis is the task of Division Two of the published Being and Time, entitled "Dasein and Temporality.

Being and heidegger pdf martin time

Rather, because the analysis necessarily includes all the ways in which we can exist, and hence all the possible problems of philosophy, the investigation is, for Heideg ger, the foundation of all philosophy. Heidegger therefore calls his entire discipline "fundamental ontology" -i.

It is this claim that fundamental ontology is the foundation for all phi losophy that most truly reflects what Heidegger is attempting in Being and Time.

His rejection of the Neo-Kantians is most pronounced here; for they had argued that the whole purpose of philosophy was to exam ine the possibilities and language of science, whereas Heidegger considers such a view of philosophy an "embarrassment. After all, such problems were the original impetus 4.

The terms "ontology" and "metaphysics" have uncertain status in Heidegger's writ ings. In Being and Time and Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, the term "metaphysics" is treated with a certain amount of respect, almost as though the term has something to do with Heidegger's own form of inquiry.

In these early works, he prefers the term "ontol ogy" or, more specifcally, "fundamental ontology" as descriptive of his own form of in quiry. In this early usage, fundamental ontology was seen as a kind of metaphysica generalis-i.

But Heidegger's resistance to traditional metaphysics and ontology grew more and more emphatic, until fnally the term "metaphysics" came to rep resent that form of inquiry against which all of Heidegger's energies were directed. Meta physics became the source of error-a discipline that concerned itself solely with objects and entities, and as such covered up the true philosophical goal, a study of Being. Conse quently, Heidegger later came to abandon the term "ontology" as descriptive of his own form of inquiry, since that term for so long had been identifed with traditional metaphysics.

In Being and Time, however, the term had not as yet lost its function as describing Heidegger's own thought; and even the term "metaphysics" had not as yet become the ob ject of his attack. At a meeting with Ernst Cassirer at Davos, Switzerland, Heidegger accused the Neo Kantians of embarrassing philosophy by limiting it to the inquiry of scientifc method.

The discussion with Cassirer at Davos was oral, but a Referat was taken by a student who at tended the conference. Neither Heidegger nor Cassirer ever had occasion to repudiate this report, and nothing said in the report is at variance with the general thought of either philosopher.

Hence it has achieved a limited though respectable authenticity among scholars. I ntroducti on 1 7 to philosophy, and to discard these problems as either secondary in im portance or even "meaningless" is to do violence to the whole reasoning behind why people philosophize at all. The search for a fundamental discipline that serves as a basis for all philosophy is by no means new in the history of thought.

Aristotle, for example, argued that "frst philosophy" must be the study of "Being qua Being" ;6 it is clear that what later came to be known as "metaphysics" was not merely another branch of the philosophical endeavor, but was the source in which all other branches of philosophy were ultimately grounded. In our present century we see a similar attempt to plunge to the very core of philosophizing in Bertrand Russell's essay "Logic as the Essence of Philosophy.

To discuss all his reasons for doing so would be out of place here. It may, however, be of service to point out that, for Heidegger, since even logic presupposes the disposi tion of the logician to attend to the purely formal relations of concepts or propositions, the analysis of how one is capable of such a disposition must be primordial.

According to Heidegger, the only possible way to develop a "frst philosophy" is to analyze the source of such categorizing. Nor can this merely be a self that knows, since knowing is only one of the possible ways in which we exist.

Being and Time

Rather, we must reflect upon the totalit of the ways in which we exist. The princi ples, then, that are to dictate the procedures for the various branches of philosophical investigation must originate from this transcendental ex amination of the existence: this is the fundamental discipline.

Thus, the task of Being and Time becomes to establish a fundamental 6. Aristotle's Metaphysics, books Alpha and Lambda. The term "metaphysics," of course, was not used by Aristotle himself, who referred to this portion of his work simply as "frst" or "primary" philosophy. This particular part of his work was termed "metaphys ics" by the librarians, who were referring merely to the spatial location of the books: the works "next to" meta the Physics.

Heidegger uses the term "primordial" in a very literal sense, "of the frst order. I make this distinction because there are some modern interpreters of Aristotle who take a different view. Heidegger, however, was rejecting the interpreters of Aristotle then prevalent in German universities.

He himself would take a more liberal interpretation of the original Greek thinker. These considerations render certain diffculties less formidable. One of the most persistent complaints heard from many critics and readers is that Heidegger promises to talk about "Being" and instead he engages in philosophical anthropology-i.

When one reads that Heidegger considers the question of the meaning of Being Seinsfrage: "to question what it meants to be" as paramount, one is led to expect a discussion similar to that of Thomistic scholasticism or Leibnizian monadology.

Instead one fnds profound analyses of man: the way in which man fnds himself in a world; the ways in which he protects his own subtle weaknesses; the ways in which he plunges to the core of his inward strength. But such analyses in the history of philosophy have usually belonged to those whose interests were not metaphysical. They are the interests of a Nietzsche or a Pascal, for whom the title "phi losopher" has been assigned, as it were, somewhat generously.

And yet Heidegger emphatically denies that he is a philosophical anthropologist: he denies that his interest is in developing a "philosophy of man. Many of the more acute critics have been confused by this: how, they ask, can Heidegger claim to be considering the question of the meaning of Being when all his energies are directed toward the descrip tion of human being in the world?

Some have gone so far as to praise the incredible insights of Heidegger's "phenomenology" and insist that Heidegger's "only mistake" was to describe his work as ontological. If we are to make sense of this seeming contradiction between what Heidegger claims his work to be and what his work seems to be to us, a certain amount of generous tolerance must be employed toward the limits of both Heidegger's expression and our understanding.

For Hei degger, the analysis of man as carried out in Being and Time is ontology. Such is the right way to study the question of the meaning of Being. If this sounds strange to our ears, we must realize that Heidegger means it to be strange. For Heidegger is seriously challenging the very meaning of philosophy itself. By critically analyzing, through reason, the very modes of our own existence, Heidegger bridges the gap between the "pure philosopher" on the one hand, who disdains the common prob lems of existence, and the "living person" on the other, who disdains the "navel contemplation" of the professional philosopher.

In doing so, how ever, he is not going to argue that "philosophy must bake bread.