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Router-integrated wireless with advanced security Easy to MANAGE a single- box Router/VPN/Firewall/IPS solution. 9. REDUCE echecs16.info The Cisco integrated services routers support network traffic filtering by means See the Cisco IOS Security Configuration Guide, Release , for more. Cisco Systems, Inc. All rights reserved. Presentation_ID. 1. Cisco IOS®. Advanced Firewall. Integrated Threat Control for. Router Security Solutions.
Unlike the software firewall, the router firewall attempts and blocks incoming query requests at server level thereby keeping your entire network safe. As the router is the endpoint of most networks and is the only point connecting any computer on your network to the Internet, turning on the router firewall keeps your network safe. Set up a Router Firewall This article talks about how to set up a router firewall or configure your router for activating the firewall. We also take a look at what all ports do you need for regular working. Type CMD and press Enter. Make a note of IP address provided next to Gateway. You will have to type that address in the form of numbers, including the dots into a browser address bar to open the router configuration page.
It does this using internal preconfigured directives, called static routes , or by learning routes dynamically using a routing protocol. Static and dynamic routes are stored in the routing table. The control-plane logic then strips non-essential directives from the table and builds a forwarding information base FIB to be used by the forwarding plane.
Forwarding plane : The router forwards data packets between incoming and outgoing interface connections. It forwards them to the correct network type using information that the packet header contains matched to entries in the FIB supplied by the control plane.
Applications[ edit ] A typical home or small office DSL router showing the telephone socket left, white to connect it to the internet using ADSL , and Ethernet jacks right, yellow to connect it to home computers and printers.
A router may have interfaces for different types of physical layer connections, such as copper cables, fiber optic , or wireless transmission.
It can also support different network layer transmission standards. Each network interface is used to enable data packets to be forwarded from one transmission system to another. Routers may also be used to connect two or more logical groups of computer devices known as subnets , each with a different network prefix. Routers may provide connectivity within enterprises, between enterprises and the Internet, or between internet service providers ' ISPs' networks. All sizes of routers may be found inside enterprises.
Large businesses may also need more powerful routers to cope with ever-increasing demands of intranet data traffic.
A hierarchical internetworking model for interconnecting routers in large networks is in common use. This page configures Dynamic DNS. Typically, they are optimized for low cost.
Distribution routers are often responsible for enforcing quality of service across a wide area network WAN , so they may have considerable memory installed, multiple WAN interface connections, and substantial onboard data processing routines.
They may also provide connectivity to groups of file servers or other external networks. Operational Focus All of the recommendations in this document have been made in an effort to optimize for operational community consensus, as best the authors have been able to determine that. This has included not only accepting feedback from public lists, but also accepting off-list feedback from people at various network operators e. Internet Service Providers, content providers, educational institutions, commercial firms.
As specified in [ RFC ], there are two cases for the format of an option: o Case 1: A single byte of option-type. The option-type has three fields: o 1 bit: copied flag. This format allows for the creation of new options for the extension of the Internet Protocol IP. Finally, the option number identifies the syntax of the rest of the option. This same CPU usually also processed network management traffic e. In such architectures, it has been common for the general-purpose CPU also to perform any packet Gont, et al.
From about onwards, a growing number of IP routers have incorporated silicon specialized for IP packet processing i. Such router architectures tend to be more resilient to DDoS attacks that might be seen in the global public Internet. Depending upon various implementation and configuration details, routers with a silicon packet-forwarding engine can handle high volumes of IP packets containing IP options without any adverse impact on packet-forwarding rates or on the router's control plane e.
However, at present, the particular architectural and engineering details of the specific IP router being considered are important to understand when evaluating the operational security risks associated with a particular IP packet type or IP option type. Operators are urged to consider the capabilities of potential IP routers for IP option filtering and handling as they make deployment decisions in the future.
Additional considerations for protecting the control plane from packets containing IP options can be found in [ RFC ]. Finally, in addition to advice to operators, this document also provides advice to router, security gateway, and firewall implementers in terms of providing the capability to filter packets Gont, et al. Best Current Practice [Page 6] RFC Filtering of IP-Optioned Packets February with different granularities: both on a "per IP option type" granularity to maximize flexibility as well as more coarse filters to minimize configuration complexity.
Advice on the Handling of Packets with Specific IP Options The following subsections contain a description of each of the IP options that have so far been specified, a discussion of possible interoperability implications if packets containing such options are dropped, and specific advice on whether to drop packets containing these options in a typical enterprise or Service Provider environment.
Uses This option is used to indicate the "end of options" in those cases in which the end of options would not coincide with the end of the Internet Protocol header. Threats No specific security issues are known for this IPv4 option. Therefore, if packets containing this option are dropped, it is very likely that legitimate traffic is blocked.
Uses The no-operation option is basically meant to allow the sending system to align subsequent options in, for example, bit boundaries. Thus, if a packet contains more than one LSRR option, it should be dropped, and this event should be logged e. Uses This option lets the originating system specify a number of intermediate systems a packet must pass through to get to the destination host. Additionally, the route followed by the packet is recorded in the option.
The receiving host end-system must use the reverse of the path contained in the received LSRR option. The LSSR option can be of help in debugging some network problems. Among other things, the option can be used to: o Bypass firewall rules. Of these attack vectors, the one that has probably received least attention is the use of the LSRR option to perform bandwidth exhaustion attacks. The LSRR option can be used as an amplification method for performing bandwidth-exhaustion attacks, as an attacker could make a packet bounce multiple times between a number of systems by carefully crafting an LSRR option.
This is the IPv4 version of the IPv6 amplification attack that was widely publicized in [ Biondi ]. The only difference is that the maximum length of the IPv4 header and hence the LSRR option limits the amplification factor when compared to the IPv6 counterpart.
Additionally, some implementations have been found to fail to include proper sanity checks on the LSRR option, thus leading to security issues. These specific issues are believed to be solved in all modern implementations. Finally, we note that some systems were known for providing a system- wide toggle to enable support for this option for those scenarios in which this option is required.
However, improper implementation of such a system-wide toggle caused those systems to support the LSRR option even when explicitly configured not to do so. This issue was resolved in later versions of the corresponding operating system. Ping and traceroute without IPv4 options are not impacted. Nevertheless, it should be noted that it is virtually impossible to use the LSRR option for troubleshooting, due to widespread dropping of packets that contain the option.
Advice Routers, security gateways, and firewalls SHOULD implement an option- specific configuration knob to select whether packets with this option are dropped, packets with this IP option are forwarded as if they did not contain this IP option, or packets with this option are processed and forwarded as per [ RFC ].
Please note that treating packets with LSRR as if they did not contain this option can result in such packets being sent to a different device than the initially intended destination.
With appropriate ingress filtering, this should not open an attack vector into the infrastructure. Nonetheless, it could result in traffic that would never reach the initially intended destination.
Dropping these packets prevents unnecessary network traffic and does not make end-to-end communication any worse. Uses This option allows the originating system to specify a number of intermediate systems a packet must pass through to get to the destination host. Additionally, the route followed by the packet is recorded in the option, and the destination host end-system must use the reverse of the path contained in the received SSRR option.
The SSRR option can be of help in debugging some network problems. Please refer to Section 4. Nevertheless, it should be noted that it is virtually impossible to use the SSRR option for trouble-shooting, due to widespread dropping of packets that contain such option.
Please note that treating packets with SSRR as if they did not contain this option can result in such packets being sent to a different device that the initially intended destination.
With appropriate ingress filtering this should not open an attack vector into the infrastructure. Dropping these packets prevents unnecessary network traffic, and does not make end-to-end communication any worse. Uses This option provides a means to record the route that a given packet follows.
Threats This option can be exploited to map the topology of a network.
However, the limited space in the IP header limits the usefulness of this option for that purpose. Operational and Interoperability Impact if Blocked Network troubleshooting techniques that may employ the RR option such as ping with the RR option would break when using the RR option.
Ping without IPv4 options is not impacted. It has been declared obsolete. Threats This option is obsolete. This option could have been exploited to cause a host to set its Path MTU PMTU estimate to an inordinately low or an inordinately high value, thereby causing performance problems. It is now obsolete. This option could have been exploited to cause a host to set its PMTU estimate to an inordinately low or an inordinately high value, thereby causing performance problems.
Uses This option originally provided a mechanism to trace the path to a host. Because this option required each router in the path both to provide special processing and to send an ICMP message, it could have been exploited to perform a DoS attack by exhausting CPU resources at the processing routers.
Operational and Interoperability Impact if Blocked None 4. Uses This option [ RFC ] is used by Multi-Level Secure MLS end-systems and intermediate systems in specific environments to: o transmit from source to destination in a network standard representation the common security labels required by computer security models [ Landwehr81 ], o validate the datagram as appropriate for transmission from the source and delivery to the destination, and, o ensure that the route taken by the datagram is protected to the level required by all protection authorities indicated on the datagram.
It is also currently deployed in a number of high-security networks. Such private IP networks commonly are built using both commercial and open-source products -- for hosts, guards, firewalls, switches, routers, etc. Section 4. Threats Presence of this option in a packet does not by itself create any specific new threat. Packets with this option ought not normally be seen on the global public Internet. Operational and Interoperability Impact if Blocked If packets with this option are blocked or if the option is stripped from the packet during transmission from source to destination, then the packet itself is likely to be dropped by the receiver because it is not properly labeled.
In some cases, the receiver might receive the packet but associate an incorrect sensitivity label with the received data from the packet whose BSO was stripped by an intermediate router or firewall. Associating an incorrect sensitivity label can cause the received information either to be handled as more sensitive than it really is "upgrading" or as less sensitive than it really is "downgrading" , either of which is problematic.
Advice A given IP router, security gateway, or firewall has no way to know a priori what environment it has been deployed into. Even closed IP deployments generally use exactly the same commercial routers, security gateways, and firewalls that are used in the public Internet. A given IP router, security gateway, or firewall MAY be configured to drop this option or to drop IP packets containing this option in an environment known to not use this option. Uses This option permits additional security labeling information, beyond that present in the Basic Security Option Section 4.
This capability Gont, et al. In some cases, the receiver might receive the packet but associate an incorrect sensitivity label with the received data from the packet whose ESO was stripped by an intermediate router or firewall. Since operational problems result in environments where this option is needed if either the option is dropped or IP packets containing this option are dropped, but no harm results if the option is carried in environments where it is not needed, the default configuration SHOULD NOT a modify or remove this IP option or b drop an IP packet because the IP packet contains this option.
Uses This option was proposed by the Trusted Systems Interoperability Group TSIG , with the intent of meeting trusted networking requirements for the commercial trusted systems marketplace.
In some cases, the receiver might receive the packet but associate an incorrect sensitivity label with the received data from the packet whose CIPSO was stripped by an intermediate router or firewall. Advice Because of the design of this option, with variable syntax and variable length, it is not practical to support specialized filtering using the CIPSO information. No routers or firewalls are known to support this option.
Option Specification The original option specification is not publicly available. Threats Not possible to determine other than the general security implications of IP options discussed in Section 3 , since the corresponding specification is not publicly available. This option was used or was intended to be used to signal that a packet superficially similar to an IPv4 packet actually contained a different protocol, opening up the possibility that an IPv4 node that simply ignored this option would process a received packet in a manner inconsistent with the intent of the sender.
There are no known threats arising from this option, other than the general security implications of IP options discussed in Section 3. Uses The Address Extension option was introduced by one of the proposals submitted during the IPng efforts to address the problem of IPv4 address exhaustion.
Threats There are no known threats arising from this option, other than the general security implications of IP options discussed in Section 3. Uses This option originally provided unreliable UDP delivery to a set of addresses included in the option. It has been formally obsoleted by [ RFC ]. Threats This option could have been exploited for bandwidth-amplification in DoS attacks.
The aforementioned document was meant to be published as "Experimental", but never made it into an RFC. Threats Possible threats include theft of service and denial of service. However, we note that this option has never been widely implemented or deployed. Uses This option was meant to solve the problem of doing upstream forwarding of multicast packets on a multi-access LAN.
It was never formally standardized in the RFC series and was never widely implemented and deployed. Its use was obsoleted by [ RFC ], which Gont, et al.
Uses This IP Option is used in the specification of Quick-Start for TCP and IP, which is an experimental mechanism that allows transport protocols, in cooperation with routers, to determine an allowed sending rate at the start and, at times, in the middle of a data transfer e.
Operational and Interoperability Impact if Blocked The Quick-Start functionality would be disabled, and additional delays in TCP's connection establishment for example could be introduced.
We note, however, that Quick-Start has been proposed as a mechanism that could be of use in controlled environments, and not as a mechanism that would be intended or appropriate for ubiquitous deployment in the global Internet [ RFC ].
Advice A given router, security gateway, or firewall system has no way of knowing a priori whether this option is valid in its operational environment. Additionally, routers, security gateways, and firewalls SHOULD have a configuration setting that governs their reaction in the presence of packets containing the Quick-Start option. The default configuration is to ignore the Quick-Start option.
We note that if routers in a given environment do not implement and enable the Quick-Start mechanism, only the general security implications of IP options discussed in Section 3 would apply. This results in four distinct option type codes: 30, 94, , and Otherwise, no legitimate experiment using these options will be able to traverse any IP router.
Other IP Options 4. Specification Unrecognized IP options are to be ignored. Section 3. Further, routers, security gateways, and firewalls MUST provide the ability to log drop events of IP packets containing unrecognized or obsolete options.
Threats The lack of open specifications for these options makes it impossible to evaluate their security implications.